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Abstract
When an agent chooses between prospects, noise in information processing generates
an effect akin to the winner’s curse. Statistically unbiased perception systematically
overvalues the chosen action because it fails to account for the possibility that noise
is responsible for making the preferred action appear to be optimal. The optimal
perception patterns share key features with prospect theory, namely, overweighting of
small probability events (and corresponding underweighting of high probability events),
status quo bias, and reference-dependent S-shaped valuations. These biases arise to
correct for the winner’s curse effect.
1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that human perception of reality is noisy and biased.1 While
randomness can be understood as a technological limitation of human cognition, systematic
behavioral biases, such as those documented in the psychological experiments of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), are more puzzling. Since there is no obvious reason why natural or
∗We thank Michal Bauer, Andrew Clausen, Olivier Compte, Ed Hopkins, Tatiana Kornienko, David
Levine, Filip Mateˇjka, Fabio Michelluci, Nick Netzer, Motty Perry, Ariel Rubinstein, Jo´zsef Sa´kovics,
Bala´zs Szentes, Tymon Tatur, and participants in various seminars and conferences for their comments.
Maxim Goryunov, Ludmila Matyskova´, Jan Sˇ´ıpek, and Regina Tukhbatullina provided excellent research
assistance.
†email: jakub.steiner@cerge-ei.cz
‡email: colinbstewart@gmail.com
1McFadden (1999) summarizes the experimental evidence as follows: “humans fail to retrieve and process
information consistently. . . . These failures may be fundamental, the result of the way human memory is
wired. I conclude that perception-rationality fails, and that the failures are systematic, persistent, pervasive,
and large in magnitude.”
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cultural evolution could not remove these biases, their prevalence suggests that they serve
a purpose.
This paper argues that perception biases arise as second-best solutions when some noise
in information processing is unavoidable. In particular, we show that overweighting of small
probability events optimally mitigates errors due to randomness. Other biases captured
by prospect theory—namely, status quo bias, and reversal of risk preferences across gains
and losses—serve the same purpose in related settings.
In addition to providing an explanation for commonly observed cognitive biases, our
analysis offers predictions about how the biases vary. Our model also provides a framework
for conceptualizing errors in decision-making, allowing us to consider, for example, whether
overweighting of small probabilities is a mistake or an optimal heuristic. Finally, our
results demonstate how explicitly modelling the structure of decision-making can illuminate
patterns of observed behavior.2
Our model separates decision-making into two stages. At the first stage, the decision-
maker observes the parameters of the decision problem and encodes them using a perception
strategy. The encoded values are then subject to stochastic noise. At the second stage, the
decision-maker chooses an action based on these noisy values of the parameters. The noise
can be interpreted as physiological randomness in the functioning of the brain, as failing to
remember or keep track of all relevant information during decision-making, or as random
computational errors. Each of these cases can be viewed as a loss of information during
the decision process. Our main focus is on the optimal design of the perception strategy:
given that noise will prevent the agent from using the true values in the second stage, how
should those values be encoded beforehand?3
One natural perception strategy to consider is the unbiased one that gives rise, on av-
erage, to the correct parameter values after the noise is added. We argue that the unbiased
strategy suffers from a problem akin to the “winner’s curse” that makes it suboptimal. Just
as a bidder in a common value auction should condition her value on winning, the design of
2Our approach lies between two opposing positions on the relevance of cognitive processes in economic
theory. On the one hand, as advocated by Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), we model and rationalize putative
behavioral mistakes as optimal strategies under informational constraints. On the other hand, we agree
with Camerer et al. (2005) that explicit modeling of the cognition process may enrich rational choice theory
and inform welfare debates.
3We view the perception strategy as being applied subconsciously and optimized through evolution rather
than through conscious reasoning. Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) present experimental evidence suggesting
that subconscious distortions drive choice even when subjects correctly identify objective probabilities. See
also Camerer et al. (2005) for a discussion of conscious and subconscious processing of probabilities.
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the perception strategy should condition on which action is chosen. Unbiased perception
fails to account for the possibility that noise is responsible for making the preferred action
appear to be optimal. Biases in perception can correct for this winner’s curse by generating
a more cautious evaluation of actions.4
The intuition for our results is simplest in the case of the status quo bias. Consider
an agent who chooses between the status quo and an alternative action. The agent’s
perception is chosen from a class of strategies differing only in the degree of status quo
bias, i.e., in the extent to which the perception of the status quo reward is exaggerated.
In particular, the strategy with no status quo bias yields unbiased perception of rewards,
whereas with a nonzero bias, the agent’s average perception systematically favors one of the
two actions. The perception problem consists of choosing the degree of bias that maximizes
the expected reward the agent receives across all possible realizations of the binary decision
problem. It turns out that the unbiased strategy is (generically) suboptimal: the optimal
perception strategy is unbiased conditional on the two options being perceived as equally
attractive, which implies that, unconditionally, it is biased.
Suppose that the average status quo is better than typical rewards from the alternative
action (as one might expect if the status quo results from previous optimizing choices).
Then unbiased perception leads to a winner’s curse because, conditional on perceiving the
alternative as optimal, the agent overvalues it. As a result, the optimal status quo bias
is positive, correcting for the winner’s curse; optimal perception makes the agent cautious
about the alternative because it may only appear to be optimal due to an error.
The main focus of this paper is the perception of probabilities. As in the preceding
example, unbiased perception of probabilities leads to a winner’s curse since errors that
increase the relative attractiveness of an action make that action more likely to be chosen.
We argue that overweighting small probabilities (and underweighting large ones) mitigates
the overoptimism stemming from the winner’s curse.
Probability distortions may, at first blush, seem unlikely to help. Biasing probabilities
does not, on average, make the agent more pessimistic or optimistic; exaggeration of small
probabilities makes the agent less inclined to fly for fear of an accident, but more inclined
to play casino games that offer a small probability of a large reward. However, such a bias
does tend to make the agent more pessimistic about attractive lotteries. The reason is that
lotteries perceived as valuable are much less likely to share the structure of a casino game
4See Compte and Postlewaite (2012) for a similar interpretation in a different setting.
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than that of a decision to fly. Compare two lotteries offering the same expected reward: one
a “flight lottery” that gives a high probability gain and a low probability loss, and the other
a “casino lottery” that gives a low probability gain and a high probability loss. For any
given loss, the two lotteries can have the same expected reward only if the low probability of
a gain in the casino lottery is compensated with a very high reward. If very high rewards
are rare, then attractive lotteries are typically like the flight lottery. Exaggerating low
probabilities therefore tends to increase the weight given to losses, reducing the perceived
value of the most attractive lotteries.
Is overweighting of small probabilities (and underweighting of large ones) a mistake? On
the one hand, since such a bias perception is an optimal response to subsequent information
loss, the agent would be worse off on average if he “debiased” his perception across all
decision problems. On the other hand, a globally optimal perception strategy may perform
poorly in some decision problems. In particular, the ex ante optimal perception strategy
performs badly when the agent faces the casino lottery described above. Since the casino
lottery is unlikely to be an attractive option, the ex ante optimal strategy introduces
relatively large perception errors in lotteries of that form. Ex post, an outside observer
who knows that the agent faces such a lottery could reasonably characterize the agent’s
perception bias as a mistake because it is suboptimal given the observer’s information.
Section 6 discusses these issues in more detail.
Our model offers predictions about the impact of the status quo on perception biases.
We find that the optimal status quo bias switches from positive to negative if the average
value of the status quo becomes lower than that of rewards from alternative actions. In
contrast, the optimal bias in probability perception has the same inverted S-shape for high
and low status quo values. This suggests that the direction of the status quo bias should
vary consistently with an agent’s well-being, while the broad shape of probability weighting
should not.
Although our model of the cognitive process is stylized, the neuroscientific literature
offers some support for a two-stage, noisy decision process. Glimcher (2009) describes the
emerging neuroeconomic consensus that the choice system in primates “involves a two-
stage mechanism. The first of these stages is concerned with the valuation of all goods and
actions; the second is concerned with choosing. . . [from] the choice set.” Tobler et al. (2008)
document that probabilities are simultaneously encoded in more than one area of the brain,
and that neuronal coding of probabilities in areas associated with probabilistic decision-
making shows an inverted S-shaped pattern. Bossaerts et al. (2009) discuss evidence that
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there are at least two imperfectly correlated brain signals involved in the choice process, one
for assessing value, the other for the choice itself. More broadly, Glimcher (2005) surveys
a body of evidence suggesting fundamental randomness in the activity of the brain.
Our paper fits into the literature on the principal-agent approach to evolution (see, e.g.,
Robson, 2001b; Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006; Robson and Samuelson, 2011). Robson
(2001a), Rayo and Becker (2007), and Netzer (2009) study the evolutionary design of
incentives for agents who cannot process information perfectly. They find that the optimal
incentives are steeper at ranges of stimuli that the agent encounters more frequently, which
can be interpreted as allocating greater attention to more common problems.5 Our results
can also be understood in terms of optimal attention allocation, but extended to choice
under uncertainty and using a different model of information processing.
Several papers study foundations for the biases captured in prospect theory. Herold and
Netzer (2010) argue that inverted S-shaped probability weighting is an optimal response
to S-shaped valuation of rewards. Similarly, Frenkel et al. (2012) view the endowment
effect as a heuristic benefitting agents who suffer from the winner’s curse in bilateral trade.
In contrast with those two papers, we derive optimal distortions in perception in the
absence of frictions in other dimensions of the decision process. Woodford (2012a,b) studies
optimal perception using insights from the rational inattention literature. Woodford’s
analysis focuses on a relatively simple objective (namely, minimization of the mean square
error) while allowing for a rich class of perception strategies. In contrast, we focus on
maximization of expected rewards, and identify systematic deviations relative to the mean-
square-error-minimizing perception.
Compte and Postlewaite (2012) study optimal heuristics for choice under uncertainty,
and identify conditions under which a decision-maker exhibits “cautiousness” toward less
certain outcomes. While our results can be interpreted similarly as a form of cautiousness,
and our status quo bias example overlaps with their model, we differ significantly in terms
of focus and modelling approach. In particular, in their model, cautiousness is optimal in
a class of relative simple strategies, whereas is in ours it is a feature of the best response
to imperfections in information processing.
5Friedman (1989) provides an early analysis of the attention allocation problem using a reduced form of
evolutionary optimization.
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2 Model
An agent faces a series of binary decision problems, one in each period t = 0, 1, . . . . In
each of these problems he chooses between a status quo that delivers payoff s, and a lottery
that pays a reward r1 or r2 with respective probabilities p and 1 − p. While all of these
parameters are observable to the agent, he may make suboptimal choices due to errors in
information processing. We distinguish between two stages of decision-making. In the first
stage, an observation center observes the probability p and sends a message m(p) ∈ [m,m]
to a decision center. The message is subject to random noise captured by a term ε drawn
from an interval; we view ε as resulting from physical noise within the agent’s brain, from
a failure to retain information, or from computational errors. The message m and noise ε
combine to form the perceived probability (or simply the perception) q = c(m, ε) ∈ [0, 1].
The function c captures both the physical properties of the communication channel and
the way in which the decision center decodes the arriving stimulus. In the second stage,
the decision center chooses the lottery if qr1 + (1 − q)r2 > s, and chooses the status quo
otherwise. Thus, for any lottery ℓ = (r1, p; r2, 1 − p) and perception q, the agent receives
expected payoff
f(ℓ, q) =

pr1 + (1− p)r2 if qr1 + (1− q)r2 > s,s otherwise.
Figure 1 summarizes the decision process.
The values of the rewards and the status quo are measured in terms of utilities that
represent expected fitness, and incorporate risk preferences. Although the function c and
the choice rule of the decision center are fixed, we implicitly allow for the possibility that
behavior is also optimized at the decision stage since, given any perception strategy, the
optimal decision rule corresponds to one of the functions c that we consider (see Section
4.1 for details). Moreover, by not insisting on optimality of c, we allow for—but do not
require—the existence of constraints in the evolution of the decision rule.
Nature chooses a perception strategy m(p; s) to maximize the agent’s ex ante expected
payoff for a given distribution over lotteries.6 Draws of p and (r1, r2) are independent, and
independent of the noise ε. In addition, the distribution of (r1, r2) is symmetric and the
density ψ of p is symmetric around 1/2, in accordance with the idea that the indices have
6When it is not needed, we often drop the argument s from the notation.
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p observation
center
channel
decision
center
lottery if
qr1 + (1 − q)r2 > s
status quo otherwise
m q = c(m, ε)
Figure 1: The two-stage decision process with interim noise.
no intrinsic meaning. An optimal perception strategy m∗(p; s) satisfies
m∗(·; s) ∈ argmax
m(·)
E [f (ℓ, c(m(p), ε))] , (1)
where the expectation is over the noise ε and the lottery ℓ. An optimal strategy always
exists. If there are multiple optimal strategies then all of our results hold for each such
strategy. We therefore ignore potential multiplicity and often refer to “the” optimal strat-
egy.
2.1 The value of the status quo
The optimal perception strategy depends on the status quo s. Although we take s to
be exogenous in our static model, one can view it as resulting from previous optimizing
choices by the agent. We argue that this makes the status quo likely to exceed the average
rewards available to the agent. This section offers a simple dynamic model formalizing this
argument.
The lottery available to the agent is i.i.d. across periods. The agent forms a perception
qt = c(m
∗(pt; st), εt) according to the optimal strategy m
∗. If, based on this perception,
the agent chooses the status quo, he enters the next period with status quo st+1 = st. If
he chooses the lottery, then the new status quo st+1 is equal to r1t with probability pt and
equal to r2t with probability 1− pt. To summarize,
st+1 =


st if the agent chooses st,
r1t if the agent chooses ℓt and r1t is drawn,
r2t if the agent chooses ℓt and r2t is drawn.
For any given initial status quo s0, we characterize the optimal perception in the long-run,
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as t grows large.
Although the agent chooses myopically in each period, one can interpret the values r1t,
r2t, and st as continuation values in a dynamic optimization problem, in which case the
choice rule optimizes over his lifetime. The only complication is that continuation values
are endogenously determined by the agent’s strategy. At an optimum, however, our results
hold under either interpretation.
Under a mild condition on the perception strategy m∗ (which we verify below), the
status quo eventually becomes large relative to the distribution of rewards in the lottery.
Intuitively, any reasonable perception strategy generates an upward drift in the status quo
because better prospects are more likely to be chosen, which in turn tends to make the
status quo grow large. Because of this result, to identify optimal behavior in the long-run,
it suffices to focus on decision problems in which the status quo is high.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the perception q = c(m∗(p; s), ε) is nondecreasing in p. Then
for each s∗ ∈ R,
lim
t→∞
Pr(st > s
∗) = 1.
Proofs are in the appendix.
3 Special case
Before analyzing the general model, in this section we illustrate the main result in a rela-
tively simple special case with a particular distribution of rewards and additively separable
noise. We relax many of the following assumptions in Section 4.
In each period, the rewards r1 and r2 are independently drawn from the standard
normal distribution. For each message m, the perception is given by q = m + ε, where
the noise ε attains values σ and −σ, each with probability 1/2, and σ ∈ (0, 1/2). To avoid
complications due to boundary effects, the density ψ(p) has support contained in [σ, 1−σ],
and the message space is [σ, 1 − σ], ensuring that the perception q is always in [0, 1].
In the absence of noise, the perception optimization problem is trivial: the unbiased
perception strategy m(p) ≡ p achieves the first-best. When there is noise, the optimal
perception strategy exhibits systematic biases.
Theorem 1. The optimal perception strategy m∗(p; s) is nondecreasing in p. Furthermore,
if s > 31/4, then the agent overstates small probabilities and understates large probabilities;
that is, for all p ∈ (σ, 1 − σ) \ {1/2}, |m∗(p; s)− 1/2| < |p− 1/2|.
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Figure 2: The optimal perception strategy m∗(p; s) (solid curve) for status quo s = 2
relative to the unbiased strategy m(p; s) ≡ p (dashed line).
Figure 2 depicts the optimal probability perception for a particular value of the status
quo.
Although the strategy m(p) describes internal communication within the agent, the
perception is in principle observable in an experiment. By varying the rewards, an exper-
imenter can recover the subject’s stochastic probability perception q = m(p) + ε of the
objective probability p. The average perception E[q | p] across many repetitions of the ex-
periment is equal to m(p). Theorem 1 therefore indicates that an agent using the optimal
strategy m∗ will be seen to be overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large
ones.
Note that Nature does not condition the perception of p on the rewards in the lottery.
If the perception could depend on rewards, the first-best could be achieved by effectively
making the observation center compute the optimal action and then send an extreme
message to the decision center indicating which action to take. By requiring the perception
strategy m(p; s) to depend only on p and s, we constrain Nature to choose a heuristic that
performs well on average across all possible rewards. This approach is consistent with
neuroscientific evidence that probabilities and rewards are processed separately (see Berns
and Bell, 2012).
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3.1 Intuition
This subsection provides an intuitive explanation for why the optimal perception strategy
overstates low and understates high probabilities.
When does a small change in perception affect choice? If the expected lottery reward
and the status quo are far apart, a small perception change does not affect the choice and
thus has no impact on outcomes. A marginal change in perception is consequential only
when the two alternatives are perceived to be a tie: that is, when qr1+(1− q)r2 = s. The
design of the optimal perception strategy, then, must condition on a tie occurring.
Conditioning on a tie tends to increase the weight placed on more extreme probabilities
because perceptions close to 0 or 1 are more likely to lead to a tie than are perceptions
close to 1/2. To see this, consider the following two lotteries, labelled with their perceived
probabilities:
❜ 
 
 
❅
❅
❅
1
2
1
2
r r1
r r2
❜ 
 
 
❅
❅
❅
0
1
r r1
r r2
The perceived value of the first lottery is (r1 + r2)/2. Ex ante, before the rewards r1 and
r2 are realized, the value of this lottery is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
1/2. The perceived value of the second lottery is r2. Ex ante, the second lottery also has
mean 0, but it has a higher variance (equal to 1). When the status quo is high, the higher
variance makes a tie with the second lottery more likely than with the first.
More generally, for any given q, the perceived expected reward from the lottery, qr1 +
(1 − q)r2, is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance q2 + (1 − q)2. Conditional
on q, the likelihood that the agent perceives a tie is φq(s), where φq is the density for the
normal distribution N(0, q2 + (1− q)2). Viewed as a function of q and suppressing s from
the notation, we define the weighting function w(q) to be equal to φq(s). Higher values of
w(q) correspond to increases in the expected fitness loss caused by an erroneous perception
q of the objective probability p.7 When s > 1, the weight w(q) is U-shaped, as depicted in
Figure 3A.
7In the next subsection, where we derive the optimal perception strategy, we find that the correct weight
given to various values of q differs from w(q) by a factor that does not affect the direction of the distortions.
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Figure 3: The likelihood of a tie between a lottery and the status quo as a function of the
perceived probability for s = 2.
How should the agent distort probabilities in light of the U-shaped weighting function?
We show that increasing the steepness of the perception function tends to reduce the effect
of errors in perception. One can view this as focusing greater attention on probabilities
at which the perception is steeper.8 For a U-shaped weighting function, more attention
should be focused on extreme probabilities than on intermediate ones, suggesting that
probabilities should be distorted according to an inverted S-shape, as in Figure 2. In the
next subsection, we clarify the trade-off between attentiveness and correctness of perception
that determines the optimal perception strategy.
Alternatively, the optimal distortion can be understood by an analogy to the winner’s
curse. Consider the na¨ıve perception strategy m(p) ≡ p. For each p, that strategy leads to
unbiased perception of the expected lottery reward in the sense that
E[r˜ − r | p] = 0,
where r = pr1+(1−p)r2 and r˜ = qr1+(1−q)r2 are, respectively, the true and the perceived
expected rewards from the lottery. Although the perception is unbiased unconditionally, it
is biased conditional on the agent perceiving a tie between the lottery and the status quo.
In particular, when the status quo is high, one can show that
E[r˜ − r | p and r˜ = s] > 0.
8See Tversky and Kahneman (1992) for a similar interpretation.
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In case of a tie, the na¨ıve perception strategy tends to overvalue the lottery because equality
with s is more likely to occur if the error ε increases the perceived value of the lottery than
if it decreases it.
Relative to the na¨ıve strategy, the optimal strategy decreases the perceived value of
the lottery conditional on a tie (this is loosely analogous to bid-shading in common value
auctions). It turns out that exaggerating small probabilities (and underreporting large
ones) does exactly that. To see how, consider the typical structure of lotteries that the
agent perceives as a tie when the status quo is large. One possibility is that the higher
probability branch is associated with a large reward, while the lower probability branch
has a smaller reward, as in the flight lottery described in the Introduction. Alternatively,
as in some casino games, the lottery can have a low probability of a very large reward
coupled with a higher probability of a lower reward. Lotteries like the flight lottery are
much more common because very large rewards are rare. In case of a tie, reducing the
perception of high probabilities and exaggerating small ones therefore tends to reduce the
perceived value of the lottery, helping to overcome the winner’s curse.
3.2 Outline of proof
To make the result as transparent as possible, in this subsection we outline a direct proof
of Theorem 1 (as opposed to proving it as a corollary of the analogous result for the general
model).
Fix s. We begin by identifying those decision problems in which, for a given perception
strategy m satisfying m(p) ∈ [p− σ, p+ σ],9 the agent may end up choosing suboptimally.
Intuitively, that will occur when the value of the lottery is close to the status quo.
For r1 6= r2, let p∗(r1, r2) be the solution to pr1 + (1 − p)r2 = s; that is, given r1 and
r2, the lottery is the optimal choice whenever p lies on one side of the threshold p
∗(r1, r2),
and the status quo is optimal on the other side (which side depends on which of r1 or r2 is
greater). A decision problem is difficult in the sense that the agent can choose suboptimally
if the parameters (p, p∗) lie in the set
D = {(p, p∗) : p∗ ∈ [m(p)− σ,m(p) + σ]} .
To see this, consider p∗ outside of [m(p) − σ,m(p) + σ]. Since p is within that interval,
9Messages outside of [p− σ, p+ σ] are never optimal.
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Figure 4: The set D of parameters at which a suboptimal choice may occur. An inverted
S-shaped perception strategy m makes D narrower at values of p∗ farther from 1/2 (such
as p∗2) at the expense of making it wider at values close to 1/2 (such as p
∗
1).
q ∈ {m(p) − σ,m(p) + σ}, and hence q and p lie on the same side of the threshold p∗,
implying that the choice based on q is optimal. Figure 4 illustrates the set D.
Given a strategy m(·), define the ex ante expected loss
L = E [max {pr1 + (1− p)r2, s} − f (ℓ,m(p) + ε)] ,
where the expectation is over the lottery ℓ and the noise ε. The loss L measures how much
the agent’s expected reward f(ℓ, q) falls below the first-best that can be attained in the
absence of noise. The following lemma expresses the loss L as a weighted integral over the
set D. Define the weighting function π(p) = λ(p)w(p), where w(p) is the likelihood of a tie
as defined in the last subsection, and λ(p) = E[(r1 − r2)2 | pr1 + (1− p)r2 = s].
Lemma 1. The expected loss satisfies L = 12
∫
D |p∗ − p|ψ(p)π(p∗)dpdp∗.
Given a threshold probability p∗, the agent suffers a large loss when (i) p∗ is likely
to generate a tie, and (ii) r1 and r2 tend to be far apart, making the value of the lottery
sensitive to the probabilities. The first effect is captured by the w(p∗) term, and the second
by λ(p∗). Combining the effects, the lemma indicates that the loss tends to be small when
13
the set D is both narrow and adheres closely to the diagonal.
Figure 4 illustrates how the slope of the perception strategy affects the loss L. The
set D is narrow precisely when m(p) is steep. Thus the inverted S-shaped perception
strategy depicted in Figure 4 performs well toward the extremes at the expense of poorer
performance at intermediate probabilities. If perception errors at intermediate probabilities
generate smaller losses than those at more extreme probabilities then this leads to an overall
gain. The following lemma confirms that this is indeed the case.
Lemma 2. If s > 31/4, then the weighting function π(p) is U-shaped: it is decreasing for
p < 1/2, increasing for p > 1/2, and symmetric with respect to p = 1/2.
To derive the optimal perception strategy, note that the integral in Lemma 1 can be
minimized pointwise with respect to p. Thus, for each p, the optimal message satisfies
m∗(p) ∈ argmax
m
∫ m+σ
m−σ
|p∗ − p|π (p∗) dp∗.
Taking the first order condition with respect to m gives the following characterization of
the optimal strategy.
Lemma 3. The optimal perception error q − p, weighted by π(q), is unbiased; that is,
E [(p− q)π(q)] =
∑
ε∈{−σ,σ}
(m∗(p) + ε− p)π(m∗(p) + ε) = 0. (2)
Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas 2 and 3. To see that the U-shaped weight implies that
it is optimal to exaggerate small probabilities, consider p < 1/2 and s > 31/4. Suppose
the observation center sends the unbiased message m = p, so that the perception is either
p − σ or p + σ. A marginal increase in m increases the loss by π(p + σ) if the error is σ,
and decreases the loss by π(p−σ) if the error is −σ. Since π(p−σ) > π(p+σ), increasing
the message reduces the expected loss.
By symmetry, the optimal perception m∗(p) at −s is identical to that at s. The agent
therefore exhibits an inverted S-shaped perception bias both when his status quo is high
and when it is low relative to typical rewards in his environment. We focus on the first
case because of Proposition 1.
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4 The general case
In this section, we return to the general model from Section 2. Compared to the special case
of Section 3, we now allow for a general distribution of rewards ρ(r1, r2) with finite third
moments, and for general perception formation q = c(m, ε), where c is continuous, increas-
ing in m, and continuously differentiable in m. The perception is nontrivially stochastic in
the sense that for every m and q, Pr(c(m, ε) = q) < 1.
The additional generality in the perception formation demonstrates that the pattern of
distortions identified in the special case is not driven by the na¨ıvete´ of the decision center.
In Section 3, the decision center interprets the received message m+ ε at face value, failing
to take into account the messaging strategy m(·) employed by the observation center. The
general model allows for (but does not require) a decision center that, in equilibrium,
correctly interprets the message, taking into account how the observation center codes the
probability. See Section 4.1 for a detailed example.
In the general formulation of the model, messages are no longer directly comparable
to probabilities. Instead, we compare the optimal perception under two objectives. In the
reward maximization problem, defined in (1), the optimal strategy m∗(p; s) maximizes the
agent’s ex ante expected reward. We use as a benchmark the precision maximization prob-
lem, in which the optimal strategy mˆ(p) minimizes the mean square error in perception;10
that is, for each p,
mˆ(p) ∈ argmin
m
E
[
(c(m, ε) − p)2] .
The precision-maximizing perception is a natural generalization of the unbiased perception
strategy that we use as the benchmark in Section 3: when noise in communication is
additive, the mean square error is minimized by unbiased perception.11
The analysis in Section 3 makes use of the weight π(p) that measures the importance
of precise perception at each probability p. We construct a general weighting function as
follows. Without loss of generality, we normalize E[(r1 − r2)2] to 1, and define a density
ρ˜(r1, r2) = (r1 − r2)2ρ(r1, r2). For each p ∈ [0, 1], let r(p) = pr1 + (1 − p)r2, where the
pair (r1, r2) is drawn according to ρ˜, and let dp(·) be the density of r(p). The weighting
function is defined to be π(p; s) = dp(s).
The weight π(p; s) captures how often the lottery with probability parameter p ties with
10Solutions to the two problems are guaranteed to exist, but there may be multiple optima, making the
functions m∗ and mˆ not uniquely defined. Our results hold for any optimal pair of m∗ and mˆ.
11In a related setting, Woodford (2012a,b) takes precision maximization as the objective of perception.
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the status quo under the density ρ˜. Precise perception is relatively important at lotteries
that have a large difference between the rewards, which is reflected in the additional mass
assigned to those lotteries by ρ˜ relative to ρ. Notice that this definition of the weight
coincides with the one from Section 3.
For each message m, let q(m) = supε c(m, ε) and q(m) = infε c(m, ε) denote the most
extreme perceptions. We require the following technical assumptions:
A1 For each m, q(m)− q(m) ≤ σ, where σ ∈ (0, 1/4).
A2 The extremes cover the full range from 0 to 1, that is, q(m) = 0 and q(m) = 1.
A3 There exists a finite upper bound r∗ such that for any p1 6= p2, the densities of the
random variables r(p1) and r(p2) do not intersect above r
∗.
Assumption A3 is a regularity condition ensuring that the tails of the densities of r(p)
are well ordered across different values of p. The condition rules out densities that, for
some pair p1 and p2, alternate infinitely often to the right of any point. In addition, it
requires that there is an upper bound on intersections that is uniform across p1 and p2.
Define the reward-maximizing perception q∗ = c (m∗(p; s), ε) and the precision-maximizing
perception qˆ = c (mˆ(p), ε).
Theorem 2. For any status quo s, the optimal message function m∗(p; s) is nondecreasing
in p. Furthermore, if s > r∗ and p ∈ [0, 1] \ (1/2 − σ, 1/2 + σ), then |m∗(p; s)− 1/2| ≤
|mˆ(p)− 1/2| , with the inequality being strict if p ∈ (σ, 1 − σ).
Proposition 1 suggests that, in the long-run, the status quo is likely to exceed r∗. In
that case, the theorem indicates that, relative to the precision-maximizing perception, the
optimal perception of small probabilities is biased upward and that of large probabilities
is biased downward.
The remainder of this section outlines two lemmas that form the main steps in the
proof of Theorem 2. The next lemma shows that the first order conditions of the two
optimization problems differ only in the weight attributed to various perception errors.
Let cm =
∂c
∂m .
Lemma 4. For any p ∈ [0, 1] such that m∗(p), mˆ(p) ∈ (m,m),
E [π(q∗)(p − q∗)cm(m∗, ε)] = 0,
and E [(p − qˆ)cm(mˆ, ε)] = 0.
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As in Section 3, the weighting function is U-shaped.
Lemma 5. For all s > r∗, π(p; s) is decreasing for p < 1/2 and increasing for p > 1/2.
The last lemma generalizes the intuition from Section 3.1 based on the observation that,
when the status quo s is large, extreme probabilities are more likely to generate ties with
s. In that section, we show that the density of the expected reward r(p) becomes more
spread out as p moves farther from 1/2. That observation turns out to hold in general:
we show in the appendix that when |p1 − 1/2| > |p2 − 1/2|, r(p1) is a mean-preserving
spread of r(p2). Combined with the regularity condition A3, that implies that r(p1) has
a thicker tail than r(p2), making r(p1) more likely to tie with a high status quo, which in
turn implies the lemma and hence Theorem 2.
4.1 Equilibrium perception
The general model focuses on optimization at the observation stage, fixing the behavior
of the decision center. One might expect that evolutionary pressures should also lead to
optimization at the decision stage. We now present a simple example to illustrate how our
model can accommodate optimization at both stages.12 For the purpose of the example,
we assume that the optimization at the decision stage is unconstrained; in the general
model, by not requiring optimization at the decision stage, we are implicitly allowing for
additional constraints at that stage.
The function c(m, ε) that identifies the perception q captures not only the physical
properties of the communication channel between the two centers, but also the way in which
the decision center decodes the stimulus it receives. For optimization by the observation
center, only the combination of those two elements matters. Here we separate them and
explicitly model both the noise and the interpretation of the stimulus.
The objective probability p is uniformly drawn from {0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1}. The rewards
r1 and r2 are drawn from the standard normal distribution, and all three lottery parameters
are independent. For simplicity, the value of the status quo is fixed at 1.5. Upon observing
p, the observation center sends a message m ∈ [0, 1] that leads to a stimulus v(m, ε)
arriving at the decision center, with noise ε uniformly drawn from [0, 1]. The mapping
v : [0, 1]2 → {0, 1/2, 1}, depicted in Figure 5, describes the communication technology
between the two centers. Messages close to 0 are likely to result in stimulus 0, messages
12To keep the analysis simple, some details of the example deviate from the main model.
17
v =
1
2
v = 0
v = 1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
m
ε
Figure 5: The communication technology: a message m ∈ [0, 1/2] results in stimulus v = 0
with probability 1 − 2m, and in stimulus 1/2 with probability 2m. Messages above 1/2
similarly lead to stimuli 1/2 or 1.
close to 1/2 are likely to result in stimulus 1/2, and messages close to 1 are likely to result
in stimulus 1. Given any stimulus v, the decision center forms a perception q(v) of the
probability p, and chooses the lottery if and only if r1q(v) + r2(1− q(v)) ≥ s. Restricting
to a decision strategy that is linear in q(v) is without loss of generality: the optimal choice
as a function of all of the information available to the decision center is guaranteed to take
this form. In terms of the notation in the main model, c = q ◦ v.
An equilibrium perception consists of a message strategy m(p) together with an inter-
pretation strategy q(v) such that (i) q(v) maximizes the expected reward from the chosen
action given m(·), and (ii) m(p) maximizes the expected reward from the chosen action
given q(·). Condition (i) is equivalent to q(v) = E[p | v(m(p), ε) = v] given m(·).
To find an equilibrium, consider a message strategy of the form m(0) = 0, m(1/4) = x,
m(1/2) = 1/2, m(3/4) = 1 − x, and m(1) = 1, with x ∈ (0, 1/2). By symmetry, the
equilibrium interpretation strategy satisfies q(1/2) = 1/2, and, by Bayes’ rule, q(0;x) =
1−2x
8(1−x) .
The equilibrium value of x is determined by an indifference condition. For p = 1/4, the
observation center must be indifferent between the stimuli 0 and 1/2, because otherwise it
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can improve its payoff by changing x. Thus,
∫ 1
4
q(0;x)
π(p∗)
(
1
4
− p∗
)
dp∗ =
∫ 1
2
1
4
π(p∗)
(
p∗ − 1
4
)
dp∗,
since the left-hand side is the loss due to incorrect perception when the decision center
receives stimulus 0 and forms perception q(0;x), and the right-hand side is the loss when
the realized perception is q(1/2) = 1/2. The indifference condition is solved by x
.
= 0.24,
implying that the perception q(0;x) formed upon receiving stimulus 0 is approximately
0.09. By symmetry, x
.
= 0.24 solves the indifference condition at p = 3/4. It is easy to
verify that the message strategy is optimal at p = 0, 1/2, and 1.
The equilibrium strategy maximizes the agent’s fitness but does not maximize the
precision of perception. To see that, consider p = 1/4. The agent’s strategy results in
perception q = 0.09 or q = 1/2. By sending the message 0, the observation center could
guarantee a perception of q = 0.09. Since the perception error 1/4 − .09 is smaller than
the error 1/2− 1/4, this change would increase precision.
For the given strategy of the decision center, the observation center exaggerates the
probability when p = 1/4 compared to the precision-maximization benchmark. As in our
main model, the difference between fitness and precision maximization arises from the fact
that positive and negative errors result in different likelihoods that the agent perceives
the decision problem as a tie. This difference arises independently of whether the decision
center interprets the messages optimally, which is why we focus on optimization at the
observation stage.
5 Other biases
This section provides a sketch of how two other behavioral biases—an S-shaped value
function and a status quo bias—can arise as optimal responses to noise in information
processing. Although certain details of the examples in this section differ from the main
model, the intuition remains the same: in each case, relative to unbiased perception, the
behavioral bias mitigates errors arising from the failure to condition on ties.
The main change from the rest of the paper is that we now focus on distortions in the
evaluation of rewards rather than probabilities. The agent chooses between a status quo s
and an alternative action that pays a (certain) reward r. As before, there are two stages
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of decision making. First, the observation center learns the value of r and sends a message
m to the decision center. The decision center receives the message with noise, forms a
perception v = m+ ε of r, and chooses the alternative action if and only if v > s. Given
r, v, and s, the agent receives reward
f(r, v, s) =

r if v > s,s otherwise.
To keep the problem nontrivial, we assume (as in the main model) that the observation
center does not have all of the information needed to determine the optimal action. To
capture this, we assume that, for some fixed s, the status quo s is distributed as N(s, 1),
and that the perception strategy depends only on s, not on s itself.13 In addition, we
assume that r ∼ N(0, 1) and ε attains values σ or −σ with equal probabilities. All random
variables are independent.
We consider two related behavioral biases that can arise depending on the space of
possible perception strategies.
5.1 S-shaped value function
We first suppose that the observation center can choose an arbitrary strategy m(r; s)
depending on r and s. We find that the optimal perception exhibits a key feature of loss
aversion, namely, convexity of perceived rewards for losses (relative to s) and concavity for
gains.
The optimal perception strategy is defined by
m∗(r; s) ∈ argmax
m∈R
E[f(r,m+ ε, s)],
where the expectation is over ε and s.
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal perception satisfies the first-order con-
dition
E [φ(s− v)(v − r)] ≡ E [φ(s−m∗(r; s)− ε)(m∗(r; s) + ε− r)] = 0, (3)
where the expectation is with respect to the noise ε, and φ is the standard normal density.
13If the observation center could condition its strategy on the exact value of s, the first-best choice could
be trivially obtained by allowing the observation center to compare the two options and send a strong signal
indicating which is preferred.
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Figure 6: Optimal perception of the reward r (solid curve) relative to unbiased perception
m(r) = r (dashed line).
The first-order condition requires the perception to be unbiased conditional on a tie; (3)
is equivalent to E [v − r | v = s] = 0. The term φ(s− v) is the likelihood that, given s and
v, the status quo s attains the value that leads to a tie. The optimal stochastic perception
is unbiased with respect to this weight. Figure 6 depicts the solution of (3). The optimal
perception is S-shaped. Relative to na¨ıve, unbiased perception, the optimal perception is
more attentive to rewards close to the average status quo, which are the ones that most
often lead to a tie.
Proposition 2. The optimal perception satisfies m∗(r; s) = r+µ(r−s), where µ is positive
and concave above 0, negative and convex below 0, and µ(−x) ≡ −µ(x).
The proposition follows directly from (3); we omit the details of the proof.
5.2 Status quo bias
We now reexamine the same perception problem except that we restrict the strategy space:
the message function m(r; s) must take the form r − e(s) for some e(s) ∈ R. We interpret
the term e(s) as a measure of the status quo bias. Nature chooses the optimal bias across
all draws of the reward r. Accordingly, the optimal strategy satisfies
e∗(s) ∈ argmax
e∈R
E[f(r, r − e+ ε, s)],
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where the expectation is over r, ε, and s.
In this case, the optimal perception solves the first-order condition
E
[
φ
(
s+ e∗(s)− ε√
2
)(
ε− e∗ (s) )] = 0. (4)
Again, the condition is equivalent to requiring perception to be unbiased conditional on a
tie. The first term in the expectation is the likelihood that r − s is such that a tie arises
between v = r − e∗(s) + ε and s.
The following proposition directly follows from (4).
Proposition 3. If s > 0, then the status quo bias e∗(s) is positive; relative to unbiased
perception, the agent overvalues the status quo.
Suppose s > 0. If the agent uses the na¨ıve, unbiased perception strategy, then a positive
value of ε leads to a tie more often than a negative value does. The unbiased strategy
therefore exhibits a kind of winner’s curse that the positive status quo bias mitigates. By
symmetry, the optimal status quo bias is the opposite when the average status quo is
negative; that is, e∗(s) = −e∗(−s). Since an optimizing agent is likely to have a status
quo that exceeds the average reward, a positive status quo bias should be typical, but a
negative bias may arise in adverse circumstances.
6 Discussion of debiasing
The gap between the normative basis of expected utility theory and the descriptive origins
of prospect theory (Thaler, 2000) has spurred an ongoing debate on “debiasing”. As
Fischhoff (1982) writes:
Once judgmental biases are identified, researchers start trying to eliminate them
using one of two strategies. The first accepts the existence of the bias and
concentrates on devising schemes, such as training programs, that will reduce
it.
Jolls and Sunstein (2006) argue that many laws are designed to counteract behavioral
biases.
This paper offers a normative foundation for prospect theory biases as optimal responses
to constraints in information processing. The optimizing role of biased perception suggests
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that caution is warranted when considering whether deviations from expected utility should
be eliminated; removing biases across all decision problems would harm the decision-maker.
Our theory suggests that probability biases are helpful in certain settings. For exam-
ple, Barseghyan et al. (2013) document overvaluation of small probabilities using data on
insurance deductible choices; clients who overweight low-probability losses prefer smaller
deductibles than would unbiased decision-makers. De Giorgi and Legg (2012) explain
the equity premium puzzle by pointing out that agents with prospect theory preferences
overvalue the probability of rare market crashes. If errorless perception were possible,
probability biases would be harmful in these cases (relative to correct perception). If, how-
ever, perception is noisy, then the observed biases can be beneficial in problems with a low
probability of generating a loss. Overvaluation of small probabilities in those problems can
be understood as a kind of cautiousness, without which the agent would select the risky
action too often when perception errors reduce the perceived likelihood of a loss.
This is not to say that decision making cannot be improved upon. Using horse-race
data, Thaler and Ziemba (1988) and Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) document excessive
betting on low probability events that pay large rewards, leading to expected losses. While
our theory suggests that overweighting of small probabilities can be helpful overall, it can
also be harmful in settings where the distribution of lotteries differs from that faced by the
decision-maker across all problems.
Why then does overvaluation of small probabilities in settings like the racetrack per-
sist? When probabilities and rewards are processed separately, Nature must design the
optimal bias across all types of problems. When high rewards are rare and the status quo
relatively good, lotteries that tie with the status quo typically feature a high probability
gain; otherwise, the low probability of a gain must be compensated by a very high reward.
From the ex ante perspective, the distortion is optimal; ex post, it can be harmful. Put
differently, debiasing may be beneficial in certain circumstances, but only in those that,
from an evolutionary perspective, rarely result in a tie.
7 Open questions
In this paper, we examine noise in evaluation of probabilities and rewards in separate
models. When only probabilities are distorted, we obtain inverted S-shaped probability
weighting, and when only rewards are distorted, we obtain an S-shaped value function and
the status quo bias. Combining noise in both parameters within a single model may lead
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to interesting interaction effects but appears to be intractable. Since Herold and Netzer
(2010) show that inverted S-shaped probability weights are an optimal response to an S-
shaped value function, we conjecture that a combined model would strengthen the degree
of probability weighting.
Our analysis precludes the possibility that perception of probabilities depends on the
value of rewards. At the other extreme, where perception can depend on the exact realized
rewards, the first-best can be attained. But what if perception depends on imperfect
information about realized rewards? We conjecture that this would introduce a difference
between perception of probabilities of gains and those of losses. In addition to the inverted
S-shape, the agent would tend to put less weight on the probability of gains (and more
on the probability of losses) since doing so would help to correct for the winner’s curse.
This conjecture is broadly consistent with experimental results on reference-dependent
probability weights (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Our restriction to binary prospects is again due to issues of tractability. Allowing
for more outcomes leads to interdependencies in the optimal perception that significantly
complicate the problem. We expect that optimal perception in the general case would share
some features of cumulative prospect theory, with inverted S-shaped probability weights
that depend on the relative magnitudes of the probabilities in the lottery.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 6. For every st, Pr(st+1 > st | st) ≥ Pr(st+1 < st | st).
Proof of Lemma 6. If both rewards in the lottery are below st, then st+1 = st. Similarly,
if both rewards are above st, then st+1 > st. Thus it suffices to prove that the claim holds
conditional on r1t and r2t lying on opposite sides of st. Consider p > 1/2 and reward
realizations (r1t, r2t) = (r1, r2) such that r1 > st > r2. By the symmetry of the reward
distribution and the distribution of p, it suffices to prove that
Pr (st+1 > st | ℓt = ℓ) + Pr
(
st+1 > st | ℓt = ℓ′
)
≥ Pr (st+1 < st | ℓt = ℓ) + Pr
(
st+1 < st | ℓt = ℓ′
)
, (5)
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where ℓ = (r1, p; r2, 1− p) and ℓ′ = (r1, 1− p; r2, p). Letting
a = Pr (qtr1 + (1− qt)r2 > st | pt = p)
and b = Pr (qtr1 + (1− qt)r2 > st | pt = 1− p) ,
we get
Pr (st+1 > st | ℓt = ℓ) + Pr
(
st+1 > st | ℓt = ℓ′
)
= pa+ (1− p)b
and Pr (st+1 < st | ℓt = ℓ) + Pr
(
st+1 < st | ℓt = ℓ′
)
= (1− p)a+ pb.
Monotonicity of the perception qt implies that a ≥ b. Since p > 1/2 by assumption, (5)
follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. We will establish the following induction step. If for some ξ ∈ (0, 1]
and all s∗ ∈ R, lim supt Pr(st < s∗) ≤ ξ then for all s∗∗ ∈ R, lim supt Pr(st < s∗∗) ≤ ξ/2.
The induction hypothesis holds for ξ = 1, and thus the induction step suffices to prove the
result.
Choose any s∗∗ and s∗ such that s∗ > s∗∗. Let
τ = Pr(st+1 > s
∗∗ | st = s∗∗)
and τ ′ = Pr(st+1 < s
∗∗ | st = s∗∗),
and notice that τ ≥ τ ′ > 0, where the first inequality follows from Lemma 6. Let ξ′ =
lim supt Pr(st < s
∗∗). We claim that
ξ′ ≤ ξ′ − τξ′ + τ ′(ξ − ξ′) + 1− Φ˜(s∗), (6)
where Φ˜ is the cumulative distribution of the perceived expected reward qr1 + (1 − q)r2
from the lottery. Since (6) holds for every s∗ and 1 − Φ˜(s∗) → 0 as s∗ → ∞, it must be
that ξ′ ≤ ξ′ − τξ′ + τ ′(ξ − ξ′), and therefore ξ′ ≤ τ ′τ+τ ′ ξ ≤ ξ/2.
It remains to prove (6). Let ξ′t be the probability that st ≤ s∗∗, and ξt the probability
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that st ≤ s∗. We have
ξ′t+1 = ξ
′
t − Pr(st+1 > s∗∗ | st < s∗∗)ξ′t
+ Pr (st+1 < s
∗∗ | s∗∗ < st < s∗) (ξt − ξ′t)
+ Pr (st+1 < s
∗∗ | st > s∗) (1− ξt). (7)
For st+1 6= st, let t (st, st+1) denote the density of the Markov kernel conditional on st.
Noting that t (st, st+1) is non-increasing in st, it follows that
Pr(st+1 > s
∗∗ | st < s∗∗) ≥ τ
and Pr (st+1 < s
∗∗ | s∗∗ < st < s∗) ≤ τ ′.
In addition,
Pr (st+1 < s
∗∗ | st > s∗) (1− ξt) ≤ 1− Φ˜(s∗)
because the status quo makes a transition only if the perceived expected reward from the
lottery exceeds the current status quo.
Substituting the three inequalities from the last paragraph into (7) gives
ξ′t+1 ≤ ξ′t − τξ′t + τ ′(ξt − ξ′t) + 1− Φ˜(s∗).
Taking the limit supremum on both sides and noting that 1− τ − τ ′ ≥ 0, we have
ξ′ ≤ lim sup
t
(
ξ′t − τξ′t + τ ′(ξt − ξ′t) + 1− Φ˜(s∗)
)
≤ ξ′ − τξ′ + τ ′(ξ − ξ′) + 1− Φ˜(s∗),
and therefore (6) holds.
B Proofs for Section 3
The definition of the weight π(q; s) = λ(q; s)w(q; s) is equivalent to
π(p; s) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∆2φ (s+∆(1− p))φ (s−∆p) d∆.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Write the expected loss L as
1
2
∫ 1−σ
σ
∫
{(r1,r2):(p,p∗(r1,r2))∈D}
|p∗(r1, r2)− p||r1 − r2|φ(r1)φ(r2)dr1dr2ψ(p)dp.
For each p, the inner integral is over the set of pairs (r1, r2) for which a suboptimal choice
can occur. When a suboptimal choice occurs, the difference in expected reward between
the lottery and the status quo is |p∗(r1, r2) − p||r1 − r2|. The factor 1/2 reflects that the
suboptimal choice occurs only for one of the two possible realizations of ε.
Consider the substitution (p∗,∆) = (p∗(r1, r2), r1 − r2) =
(
s−r2
r1−r2
, r1 − r2
)
in the inner
integral. It is straightforward to verify that the Jacobian associated with this substitution
has determinant 1r1−r2 =
1
∆ . Therefore, the expression for L becomes
1
2
∫ 1−σ
σ
∫ m(p)+σ
m(p)−σ
|p∗ − p|π(p∗)dp∗ψ(p)dp,
as needed.
Proof of Lemma 2. First we compute λ(q). Write the random variable r1 − r2 as aζ + bζ⊥
where ζ = qr1+(1− q)r2 and ζ⊥ = −(1− q)r1+ qr2. Note that ζ and ζ⊥ are independent.
Comparing the coefficients, we obtain
a = − 1− 2q
(1− q)2 + q2 , b = −
1
(1− q)2 + q2 .
Conditional on ζ = s, the random variable r1 − r2 has mean as and variance V =
b2V ar(ζ⊥) = b2((1 − q)2 + q2). Thus we have
λ(q) = E
[
(r1 − r2)2 | ζ = s
]
= (as)2 + V =
q2 + (1− q)2 + s2(1− 2q)2
(q2 + (1 − q)2)2 .
Multiplying the last expression by w(q) = φq(s) gives
π(q; s) =
q2 + (1− q)2 + s2(1− 2q)2
(q2 + (1− q)2)2
1√
q2 + (1− q)2φ1
(
s√
q2 + (1− q)2
)
,
which is symmetric around q = 1/2.
Let y = 1√
q2+(1−q)2
and note that y is increasing in q and attains values in (1,
√
2] if
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q ∈ (0, 1/2]. Therefore, it suffices to prove that
π(q(y); s) =
1√
2π
e−
s
2
y
2
2 y3(1 + 2s2 − s2y2)
is decreasing in y on (1,
√
2]. Differentiating gives
∂π(q(y); s)
∂y
=
1√
2π
e−
s
2
y
2
2 y2
[
s4y4 − 2(s2 + 3)s2y2 + 3(2s2 + 1)] .
This derivative is negative if the expression in the square brackets is negative, which is the
case whenever
y2 ∈
(
s2 + 3−√s4 + 6
s2
,
s2 + 3 +
√
s4 + 6
s2
)
. (8)
For s > 31/4, this interval contains [1, 2], and therefore (8) holds for y ∈ (1,√2].
Proof of Theorem 1. For m ∈ [p−σ, p+σ], define the loss l(m, p) = ∫m+σm−σ |p∗−p|π(p∗)dp∗.
Then m∗(p) maximizes −l(m, p). Notice that
∂2
∂p∂m
(−l(m, p)) = π(m− σ) + π(m+ σ) > 0,
and thus m∗(p) is non-decreasing.
Consider p ∈ [σ, 1/2). Suppose for contradiction that m∗ ≤ p (here we suppress the
argument of m∗(p) from the notation). Then, by Lemma 2, π(m∗ − σ) > π(m∗ + σ), and
hence
E[π(m∗ + ε)(m∗ + ε− p)] = 1
2
π(m∗ + σ)(m∗ + σ − p) + 1
2
π(m∗ − σ)(m∗ − σ − p)
< π(m∗ + σ)
(
1
2
(m∗ + σ − p) + 1
2
(m∗ − σ − p)
)
= π(m∗ + σ) (m∗ − p) ≤ 0,
violating (2) in Lemma 3. Therefore, m∗ > p. The argument for p ∈ (1/2, 1 − σ] is
analogous.
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C Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 4. The second equation follows directly from the first-order condition for
the precision maximization problem.
For the first equation, first note that
π(q; s) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(r1 − r2(r1; q))2 ρ (r1, r2 (r1; q))
(1− q) dr1,
where r2(r1; q) is the value of r2 that leads to a tie given r1 and q, that is, r2(r1; q) =
s−qr1
1−q .
Let F = E[f(ℓ, c(m, ε)) | p] be the expected reward when the observation center ob-
serves p and sends message m. We have
F = E
[∫
c(m,ε)r1+(1−c(m,ε))r2<s
sρ(r1, r2)dr1dr2
+
∫
c(m,ε)r1+(1−c(m,ε))r2>s
(pr1 + (1− p)r2)ρ(r1, r2)dr1dr2
]
,
where the expectation is with respect to the noise ε, as are all other expectations for the
remainder of this proof.
The expected reward F is continuous inm and the message space is compact. Therefore,
an optimal message exists. Moreover, since F is continuously differentiable in m, the
optimal message must, for each p, satisfy the first-order condition ∂∂mF = 0 whenever it is
interior. Computing the derivative, we obtain
∂
∂m
F = E
[
cm(m, ε)
∫ ∞
−∞
(s− (pr1 + (1− p)r2(r1; c(m, ε)))) s− r1
(1− c(m, ε))2 ρ(r1, r2(r1; c(m, ε)))dr1
]
= E
[
cm(m, ε)
∫ ∞
−∞
(c(m, ε)r1 + (1− c(m, ε))r2(r1; c(m, ε)) − (pr1 + (1− p)r2(r1; c(m, ε))))
·c(m, ε)r1 + (1− c(m, ε))r2(r1; c(m, ε)) − r1
(1− c(m, ε))2 ρ(r1, r2(r1; c(m, ε)))dr1
]
= E
[
cm(m, ε)
∫ ∞
−∞
p− c(m, ε)
1− c(m, ε) (r1 − r2(r1; c(m, ε)))
2 ρ(r1, r2(r1; c(m, ε)))dr1
]
= E [(p− c(m, ε))cm(m, ε)π(c(m, ε))] ,
as needed.
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The next two lemmas are required for the proof of Lemma 5.
Definition 3. Let X1 and X2 be real-valued random variables with distribution functions
F1 and F2, respectively. We say that X1 is a mean-preserving spread of X2 if
1. E[X1] = E[X2], and
2. for every x ∈ R, ∫ x
−∞
F1(X)dX ≥
∫ x
−∞
F2(X)dX.
14 (9)
Lemma 7. Let X be a random variable with distribution function F (·). Let Y1(X) and
Y2(X) be random variables with distribution functions G1(X)(·) and G2(X)(·), respectively,
such that, for each X, Y2(X) is a mean-preserving spread of Y1(X). Finally, let Zi be the
random variable obtained by composition of X and Yi (so that Zi has distribution function
Hi(Z) =
∫∞
−∞Gi(X)(Z)dF (X)). Then Z2 is a mean-preserving spread of Z1.
Proof. We need to show that (i) Z1 and Z2 have the same mean, and (ii)
∫ t
−∞H2(Z)dZ ≥∫ t
−∞H1(Z)dZ for every t.
For claim (i),
E[Z1] =
∫ ∞
−∞
E[Y1(X)]dF (X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
E[Y2(X)]dF (X) = E[Z2].
For claim (ii),
∫ t
−∞
H2(Z)dZ =
∫ t
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
G2(X)(Z)dF (X)dZ
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ t
−∞
G2(X)(Z)dZdF (X)
≥
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ t
−∞
G1(X)(Z)dZdF (X)
=
∫ t
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
G1(X)(Z)dF (X)dZ
=
∫ t
−∞
H1(Z)dZ,
14There is some disagreement in the literature on this terminology. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and
Mu¨ller (1998) use the term “mean-preserving spread” much more narrowly; what we call a mean-preserving
spread, Mu¨ller (1998) calls a mean-preserving φ-increase in risk.
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where the inequality follows from Y2(X) being a mean-preserving spread of Y1(X) for each
X.
Recall that the random variable r(p) is defined as pr1+(1−p)r2, where the pair (r1, r2)
is drawn according to the density ρ˜(r1, r2) = (r1 − r2)2ρ(r1, r2).
Lemma 8. If |p1 − 1/2| > |p2 − 1/2| then r(p1) is a mean-preserving spread of r(p2).
Proof of Lemma 8. For each r1 and r2, define r
+(p) = pr1 + (1 − p)r2, and r−(p) =
(1−p)r1+pr2. Let ℓˆ(r1, r2, p) be the binary lottery (r+(p), 1/2; r−(p), 1/2). The symmetry
of ρ˜ implies that r(p) is equivalent in distribution to the compound lottery in which (r1, r2)
is drawn from ρ˜, and then r(p) is drawn from ℓˆ(r1, r2, p).
By Lemma 7, it suffices to show that if |p1 − 1/2| > |p2 − 1/2|, then for each draw of
(r1, r2), the binary lottery ℓˆ(r1, r2, p1) is a mean-preserving spread of ℓˆ(r1, r2, p2). This is
indeed the case since both lotteries have the same mean (r1+r2)/2, and r
+(p2) and r
−(p2)
lie in between r+(p1) and r
−(p1).
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider p1 and p2 such that |p1− 1/2| > |p2− 1/2|. Let X1 = −r(p1)
and X2 = −r(p2). By Lemma 8, X1 is a mean-preserving spread of X2. Let F1(x) =∫ +∞
−x dp1(x
′)dx′ and F2(x) =
∫ +∞
−x dp2(x
′)dx′ be the distribution functions of X1 and X2,
respectively.
By the regularity condition A3, either dp1(x) > dp2(x) for all x > r
∗, or dp1(x) < dp2(x)
for all x > r∗. For the sake of contradiction, suppose the latter. Then F1(x) < F2(x) for
all x < −r∗ and hence ∫ −r∗
−∞
F1(x
′)dx′ <
∫ −r∗
−∞
F2(x
′)dx′,
which contradicts that X1 is a mean preserving spread of X2.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first prove the second sentence of the proposition (the comparison
between m∗(p; s) and mˆ(p; s)). Consider p ∈ [0, 1/2− σ]. The argument for p > 1/2 + σ is
analogous.
By Lemma 4 together with the corresponding inequalities for corner solutions,
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E [(p− c(m∗, ε))cm(m∗, ε)π(c(m∗, ε))]


≤ 0 if m∗ = m,
= 0 if m∗ ∈ (m,m),
≥ 0 if m∗ = m,
E [(p − c(mˆ, ε))cm(mˆ, ε)]


≤ 0 if mˆ = m,
= 0 if mˆ ∈ (m,m),
≥ 0 if mˆ = m.
Let m1/2 = sup{m : q(m) ≤ 1/2}. For any m > m1/2, it follows from assumption
A1 that, for every ε, c(m, ε) ≥ q(m) − σ ≥ 1/2 − σ > p. Hence m cannot satisfy the
first-order condition for either problem, and we must have mˆ(p),m∗(p) ≤ m1/2. Therefore,
we can restrict attention to messages m satisfying m ≤ m1/2. For this range, π(c(m, ε)) is
decreasing in m.
Fixing p, let
∆∗(m′,m) = E
[
f(ℓ, c(m′, ε)) − f(ℓ, c(m, ε)) | p]
and
∆ˆ(m′,m) =
π(p)
2
(
−Lˆ(m′, p) + Lˆ(m, p)
)
,
where Lˆ(m, p) = E
[
(c(m, ε) − p)2]. These two expressions may be interpreted as the
payoff difference between messages m′ and m under fitness and precision maximization,
respectively, with the caveat that we have rescaled the payoffs in the precision maximization
problem by pi(p)2 .
We claim that
∆∗(m′,m) > ∆ˆ(m′,m)
whenever m′ ∈ (m,m1/2). This implies that m∗(p) ≥ mˆ(p) by Theorem 1 in Van Zandt
(2002).
To prove the claim, first define
δ∗(q′, q) = E
[
f(ℓ, q′)− f(ℓ, q) | p]
and
δˆ(q′, q) =
π(p)
2
(−(q′ − p)2 + (q − p)2) .
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Note that ∆∗(m′,m) = E [δ∗(c(m′, ε), c(m, ε))] and ∆ˆ(m′,m) = E
[
δˆ(c(m′, ε), c(m, ε))
]
.
Since c(m, ε) is increasing in m, it suffices to show that
δ∗(q′, q) > δˆ(q′, q) (10)
for all q′, q ∈ [0, 1/2] such that q′ > q.
It is straightforward to verify that
δ∗(q′, q) =
∫ q′
q
(p − p∗)π(p∗)dp∗, (11)
and
δˆ(q′, q) =
∫ q′
q
(p − p∗)π(p)dp∗; (12)
(11) follows from considering cases based on how q and q′ compare to the critical probability
p∗, while (12) can be verified directly by integration. Inequality (10) holds whenever
q < q′ ≤ 1/2 because π is decreasing, and hence the integrand in (11) strictly exceeds that
in (12) for all p∗ ∈ [q, q′] \ {p}.
So far we have established only a weak inequality between m∗(p) and mˆ(p); we will
show that the inequality must be strict for all p ∈ (σ, 1/2 − σ). Note first that if p > σ
then, by assumptions A1 and A2, c(m, ε) ≤ σ < p for all ε, and hence m cannot solve
the optimality condition for either problem. Similarly, m cannot be optimal, and we can
restrict attention to interior solutions.
Consider p ∈ (σ, 1/2 − σ). Suppose for contradiction that m∗(p) = mˆ(p) = m, where
m ∈ (m,m). By the first-order condition for the precision maximization problem,
E [(p − c(m, ε))cm(m, ε)π(p)] = 0. (13)
Since
(p− c(m, ε))cm(m, ε)π(c(m, ε)) ≥ (p− c(m, ε))cm(m, ε)π(p) (14)
for every ε, the left-hand side of (13) is less than E [(p− c(m, ε))cm(m, ε)π(c(m, ε))]. More-
over, the inequality in (14) is strict unless c(m, ε) = p, which happens with probability less
than 1. Therefore, E [(p− c(m, ε))cm(m, ε)π(c(m, ε))] > 0, contradicting that m solves the
reward maximization problem.
To prove thatm∗(p) is nondecreasing, note first that δ∗(q′, q) is increasing in p when q′ >
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q. Since ∆∗(m′,m; p) = E [δ∗(c(m′, ε), c(m, ε))] and c(m, ε) is increasing in m, ∆∗(m′,m)
must be increasing in p whenever m′ > m. The result then follows from Theorem 1 in
Van Zandt (2002).
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